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Abstract—Machine learning (ML) techniques have been in-
creasingly used in anomaly-based network intrusion detection sys-
tems (NIDS) to detect unknown attacks. However, ML has shown
to be extremely vulnerable to adversarial attacks, aggravating the
potential risk of evasion attacks against learning-based NIDSs. In
this situation, prior studies on evading traditional anomaly-based
or signature-based NIDSs are no longer valid. Existing attacks
on learning-based NIDSs mostly focused on feature-space and/or
white-box attacks, leaving the study on practical gray/black-box
attacks largely unexplored.
To bridge this gap, we conduct the first systematic study of the
practical traffic-space evasion attack on learning-based NIDSs.
We outperform the previous work in the following aspects: (i)
practical—instead of directly modifying features, we provide a
novel framework to automatically mutate malicious traffic with
extremely limited knowledge while preserving its functionality;
(ii) generic—the proposed attack is effective for any ML classifiers
(i.e., model-agnostic) and most non-payload-based features; (iii)
explainable—we propose a feature-based interpretation method
to measure the robustness of targeted systems against such
attacks. We extensively evaluate our attack and defense scheme
on Kitsune, a state-of-the-art learning-based NIDS, as well as
measuring the robustness of various NIDSs using diverse features
and ML classifiers. Experimental results show promising results
and intriguing findings.
Index Terms—Network intrusion detection systems (NIDS), ad-
versarial example, adversarial machine learning, evasion attack.
I. INTRODUCTION
NETWORK intrusion detection systems (NIDS) play acritical role on detecting malicious activities in networks.
Based on the detection mechanism, NIDSs can be generally
classified into two types: signature-based ones match abnormal
patterns in the predefined signatures’ database while anomaly-
based ones find deviations from normal profiles [1]. However,
due to the intrinsic adversarial nature of NIDSs, skilled
attackers continually strive to conduct evasion attacks to
prevent their malicious activities from being detected [2]–
[4]. Evasive techniques against signature-based NIDSs have
been extensively studied in prior studies [2], [5]–[8], of which
the main principle is finding a stealthy way to conceal their
abnormal signatures. As for anomaly-based NIDSs, some early
work [9]–[11] conducted mimic attack that encoded malicious
traffic to mimic the normal profile, in order to evade systems
using simple statistics such as byte frequency [12].
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TABLE I
COMPARISON OF ASSUMPTIONS IN EVASION ATTACKS
Assumptions FWA FGA FBA TWA PGA PBA†
Directly modify features
Knowledge on classifiers∗
Knowledge on feature extractors
†FWA/FGA/FBA/TWA: Feature/Traffic-space White/Gray/Black box Attack
PGA/PBA (Ours): Practical (traffic-space) Gray/Black box Attack
∗Under this assumption, means the attacker has full knowledge about the ML model
(including parameters, outputs, etc.), can only acquire the output probabilities, and
neither has any knowledge nor can access to the ML model.
Over the last decade, the paradigm on network attacks and
intrusion detection has dramatically shifted. Anomaly-based
NIDSs tend to play an incremental role to find unknown attacks
(such as zero-day attack) that cannot be detected by signature-
based ones. Moreover, as traffic volume grows exponentially
as well as more and more traffic is encrypted, payload-
based detection becomes difficult and inefficient. Recently,
machine learning (ML) techniques are increasingly employed
in anomaly-based NIDSs for non-payload-based detection. For
example, Mirsky et al. presented Kitsune [13], an online
NIDS using an ensemble of neural networks, achieving over
99% AUC (Area Under the Curve) in most cases.
In this context, existing evasion methods on signature-based
[2], [5], or payload-based NIDSs [9], [10] are no longer
effective. However, more opportunities can be provided due to
internal vulnerabilities of ML discovered in recent research [14]–
[16]. Although there have been many studies on evading other
learning-based systems classifying images [17]–[19], videos
[20], texts [21], and malware [22]–[25], it is still non-trivial for
NIDSs since: (1) feature extraction/mapping on network traffic
is much more sophisticated; (2) we need to ensure that there is
no communication violation or compromise of maliciousness
when modifying malicious traffic.
Unfortunately, existing studies on evading learning-based
NIDSs [26]–[30] mostly conduct the feature-space attacks—
they only focus on modifying the input of classifiers (i.e.,
features) rather than the input of systems (i.e., network traffic).
However, feature extraction/mapping in NIDSs is neither
invertible nor differentiable, making feature-space attacks
rather over-simplistic and impractical. Meanwhile, most studies
directly employ gradient-based adversarial example attacks
against image classification [16]–[19]. However, such attacks
are only useful for Deep Neural Networks but cannot be
applied to other ML models without obtainable gradients
such as Decision Tree. Moreover, although there are few
studies conducting traffic-space attacks, they are just randomly
mutating the traffic [31], [32], or based on a strong white-box
assumption of having full knowledge about the NIDS [33].
In summary, we face three challenges to develop a practical
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2and generic study on evading learning-based NIDSs:
• Practicability. How to perform a functionality-preserving
traffic-space evasion attack with extremely limited knowledge
and affordable overhead?
• Generality. How to propose a generic framework effective
for NIDSs using various features and ML models?
• Explainability. How to interpret the fragility and improve
the robustness of learning-based NIDSs against such attacks?
In light of the challenges, we formulate the evasion attack
as a bi-level optimization problem and solve it by presenting
a heuristic adversarial packet crafting framework, which can
automatically mutate malicious traffic and select the best traffic
mutant whose extracted features are most like benign. To
solve the first and second challenges, we summarize commonly
used features in most state-of-the-art learning-based NIDSs
and then present several traffic mutation operators which can
influence all summarized features without breaking malicious
functionality. Attackers without detailed information about the
feature extractor in the targeted system can also benefit from
this summarized intelligence. Moreover, we extend the prior
ideas of using generative adversarial network (GAN) to treat
the targeted ML classifiers as a black box, thus can evade
any ML models. To solve the third challenge, we propose
a feature-space interpretation method to effectively measure
the robustness of NIDSs. By quantifying the extent to which
each feature is manipulated by attackers, we propose a defense
strategy by removing features with poor security scores.
Contributions. Our major contributions involve presenting a
novel evasion attack and defense on learning-based NIDSs in
practical settings, followed by evaluation and interpretation.
Specifically, they are elaborated as follows:
• We present the first practical traffic-space evasion attack on
learning-based NIDSs under gray and black box assumptions.
• We propose a feature interpretation method for evaluating
the adversarial robustness of targeted NIDSs.
• We use six attack traffic sets to extensively evaluate our attack
and defense method on the state-of-the-art NIDS Kitsune,
as well as various learning-based NIDSs including six typical
ML classifiers and two feature extractors (packet-based and
flow-based). Significant insights behind the attack are also
explored through in-depth analysis.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: We start by
providing backgrounds in Section II. Section III introduces
the threat model, as well as the formulation, motivation, and
overview of our attack. Section IV and Section V elaborate two
steps in our attack. The defense schemes are provided in Section
VI. Experimental results and findings are shown in Section
VII. We make discussions on limitations and improvements
in Section VIII. Finally, we summarize the related work in
Section IX and conclude in Section X.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we introduce the general architecture of
learning-based NIDSs and introduce non-payload-based detec-
tion. Then we formulate existing evasion attacks and summarize
their unreasonable assumptions.
Learning-based NIDS. In general, a learning-based NIDS
consists of traffic capture, feature engineering and classification
Fig. 1: The general architecture of learning-based NIDSs.
as shown in Fig. 1. First, network traffic is captured for
generating traffic dataset. Then the set of features is extracted,
selected, and eventually fed into the ML classifier for training
or prediction. To give an illustration of learning-based NIDSs,
we briefly introduce Kitsune [13] as a state-of-the-art case.
Kitsune employs external libraries (e.g. tshark) to acquire raw
packets. Then its feature extractor called AfterImage retrieves
one feature vector from the meta information of each packet
which contains over 100 statistics. Finally, features are mapped
into groups and then fed into two-layer ensemble Autoencoders.
Non-payload-based NIDS. In this study, we focus on evading
learning-based NIDSs in which packets’ payload is not in-
spected (called non-payload-based). We think this is reasonable
due to two considerations: Firstly, we find that most learning-
based NIDSs are likely to use non-payload-based features as
inspecting payload is heavy and even impossible for encrypted
traffic nowadays. Secondly, evading payload-based anomaly-
based NIDSs has been well studied [9], [10]. Note that non-
payload-based NIDSs prefer to detect attacks that rely on
volume and/or iteration such as DoS/DDoS (Distributed Denial
of Service), scanning, brute force, and Bot/Botnet. Other attacks
related to specific content such as remote code execution and
SQL injection are out of the scope of such NIDSs.
Existing evasion attacks. In a nutshell, evasion attacks aim at
finding variants with the same malicious behavior as original
samples but can be misclassified as benign by the targeted
system. For illustration purposes, we use the function E(·) to
represent the extraction from a series of related traffic to feature
vectors and C(·) to represent ML classifiers that take feature
vectors as input and output the malicious probabilities. At any
certain time, we denote by t and tˆ two series of related original
and mutated malicious traffic used to extract two feature vectors
f and fˆ , respectively (i.e., E(t) = f and E(tˆ) = fˆ ). Table I
lists current evasion attacks (i.e., FWA/FGA/FBA and TWA)
on learning-based NIDSs and their assumptions. In general,
there are two impractical assumptions in these studies:
1) Directly modifying features’ value (e.g., [26], [29], [30]).
Many previous studies merely find evasive features as
solving argminfˆ C(fˆ ), which directly modify features’
value without considering how to mutate traffic.
2) Requiring targeted classifiers’ output (e.g., [24], [29],
[33]). Some work assumes that classifiers’ specific output
is attainable, then evasion attacks can be regarded as solving
an optimization problem: argmintˆ C
(E(tˆ)) .
However, directly modifying features cannot be operated in
practice as extraction from traffic to features is not invertible.
Detailed settings or output probability of ML classifiers are
often unavailable since they are just an intermediate step in
real-world NIDSs. Since the above two assumptions are rather
impractical in real-world settings, we relax them in our attack.
3(a) Intuitive attack framework in feature space
(b) Motivation examples of adversarial features
generation (c) The complete framework of our evasion attack.
Fig. 2: Attack methodology. In (a) and (b), each plot depicts a high-dimensional feature space, in which the distribution of benign features in
the targeted classifier is enclosed by a solid line with green; benign, malicious, and adversarial features are represented by small solid circles,
crosses, and triangles respectively. In (b), the limited ability/overhead of an attacker is represented by a red neighborhood.
III. ATTACK METHODOLOGY
In this section, we firstly define the threat model of two
practical attacks, and then present our attack method by
formulating it into an optimization problem. Finally, the
motivation and overview of our solution are introduced.
A. Threat Model
We consider an attacker starts with a series of traffic with
malicious intent and wants to evade a learning-based NIDS
using non-payload-based features. Unlike previous white/gray-
box attacks, the attacker neither requires any knowledge about
the target classifier nor its output label or probability. Unlike
previous feature-space attacks, the attacker can only mutate
original traffic generated from the devices he/she controls (i.e.
traffic-space attack) at an affordable overhead. Additionally,
based on the different knowledge of features used in the targeted
NIDS, the attacker can perform the following two attacks:
• Practical Gray-box Attack (PGA). In this case, the full
features used in the targeted NIDS are known, which means
that the attacker can build the same feature extractor as the
NIDS and use it to extract features exactly. This may seem
extreme, but the features are often published [13], [34]–[39].
• Practical Black-box Attack (PBA). We assume a more
practical case, in which the attacker has very limited
knowledge about the features used in the targeted NIDS. In
this case, the attacker can only use his/her knowledge about
widely-used features and build a surrogate feature extractor.
B. Practical Traffic-space Evasion Attack Problem
According to the threat model, firstly, we relax two assump-
tions in Section II by training a substitute classifier C′(·) with
probabilistic output to approximate C(·). This also solves the
problem that some ML models without continuous output
values (such as Isolation Forest) are difficult to optimize.
Another difficulty is how to ensure that the mutated traffic still
contains the malicious behavior. For one thing, we guarantee
that original traffic will not be destroyed during mutating.
For another, the extra injected traffic should not affect the
functionality of the original traffic. (Details on how to preserve
the functionality will be discussed later in Section V-A).
Secondly, we build the surrogate feature extractor E ′(·). As
for PGA, E ′(·) is exactly the same as E(·), while is simulated
as for PBA. Additionally, we denote the mutate operation as
M(·) which can transform original traffic t to a set consists
of all possible mutated traffic tˆ. We say a mutate operation
is safe (denoted by Ms(·)) if the mutation can preserve the
malicious functionality of t. Therefore, the evasion attack can
be formulated as solving:
argmintˆ C′
(E ′(tˆ)) s.t. tˆ ∈ Ms(t) (1)
Obviously, problem (1) is intuitive but hard to solve. We
now transform it through the idea of mimicking normal
features: Since the normal profile in a learning-based NIDS
is constructed by the classifier fed with features, there are
reasonable grounds to believe that features can implicitly give
expression to the normal profile. Therefore, given a rational
distance metric L(·, ·) and a benign feature f?, the closer a
feature vector fˆ is to f?, the more likely fˆ is classified as
benign by the targeted classifier. Consequently, we transform
problem (1) into the following bi-level optimization problem:
argmintˆ L
(
E ′ (tˆ), f?) (2)
s.t. f? = argminf? L
(
f?, E ′ (t) ) (3)
C′ (f?) < h (4)
tˆ ∈ Ms(t) (5)
where h is the anomaly threshold in the ML model. C′ (f?) <
h means that f? is classified as benign.
Overall, we solve the above problem by separately solving
the lower and upper-level objective function. In other words,
we firstly solve f? in (3) under the constraint (4), and then
use the solved f? to search tˆ in (2) under the constraint
(5). To give intuition of this solving process, Fig. 2a depicts
these two steps from the perspective of feature-space. The
classifier in a targeted NIDS is trained beforehand to make a
distinction between the distribution of benign and malicious
features. Firstly, for each malicious feature, an f? is produced
which can be not only classified as benign but also as close as
possible to the malicious feature in terms of features’ value;
we refer to such feature as adversarial feature. In general, f?
4lies on the low-confidence region of the classifier. Generating
adversarial features is what problem (3) aims to solve. Secondly,
original malicious traffic is mutated to transfer its features to
the closest adversarial/benign ones, which is what the whole
problem (2) aims to solve.
C. Motivation and Overview of Solution
We now introduce specific methods employed in the afore-
mentioned two steps to solve the bi-level optimization. We use
an enhanced generative adversarial network (GAN) model to
generate the adversarial features (Eq. (3)), and particle swarm
optimization (PSO) to search evasive traffic mutants (Eq. (2)).
We now introduce the motivation of adopting GAN and PSO,
and how to combine them to complete the evasion attack.
Why generating f?? In a nutshell, adversarial features f?
can save the overhead of modifying traffic/features when the
attacker’s overhead budget or ability is limited. For one thing,
an attacker is likely to have a budget of overhead (such as
the extra time and crafted traffic volume to evade detection).
For another, we note that the attacker’s ability to modify
traffic/features is limited in practice. For examples, excessively
increasing the interval time will cause the connection timeout,
and injecting excessive traffic may be perceived by the victim.
Fig. 2b provides examples to demonstrate the necessity of
adversarial features. If a malicious feature is beyond the
attacker’s overhead budget/ability, it cannot be transformed into
a benign one by any means (Scenario 1). Without guidance of
adversarial features, a malicious feature may eventually fail
to reach the nearest benign space (Scenario 2) or miss the
transient benign space (Scenario 3).
Why GAN? Adversarial features generation needs to be: (1)
model-agnostic—we assume the attacker has no knowledge
about the ML classifier; and (2) efficient—there may be tons of
malicious/traffic in practice. GAN [40] consists of two neural
networks, generator and discriminator, contesting with each
other to complete a min-max game. Inspired by previous ideas
[25], [29], GAN is highly competent to generating adversarial
features since (1) the discriminator can be trained as a substitute
for the targeted classifier, thus conducting model-agnostic
attack; (2) once the generator is trained, it can generate f?
efficiently for any malicious feature.
Why PSO? Network traffic is difficult to directly participate
in the numerical calculation, so we vectorize traffic as high
dimensional vectors involving meta-information of packets’
header. Note that, the vectorization from traffic to vectors is
invertible. Therefore, problem (2) turns into finding best meta-
info vectors. However, unlike continuous feature space, each
dimension of the meta-info vectors has various discrete values,
thus problem (2) is indeed a hard combinatorial optimization
task (NP-complete). Hence, we resort to swarm intelligence
algorithms to find approximate solutions. We employ PSO [41]
since it is a simple but powerful method with great adaptability
on dealing with high dimensional tasks.
How they work together? In a nutshell, GAN generates the
optimization objective of PSO. In other words, when mutating
malicious traffic based on PSO, we find traffic mutants with
the best evasive effectiveness by measuring their similarity
to the adversarial features generated by GAN. Specifically,
the proposed evasion attack method is illustrated in Fig. 2c,
including the following two steps:
• Adversarial Features Generation: We assume an attacker
wants to launch some activities, which will induce a series
of malicious traffic. First, the attacker needs to collect some
benign traffic in the network he/she controls. Then, two kinds
of traffic are extracted into features by the surrogate extractor,
and fed into our GAN model. After the training phase, the
generator is capable to generate adversarial features.
• Malicious Traffic Mutation: After generating adversarial
features, we employ PSO with predefined operators to mutate
malicious traffic automatically. Each particle in the swarm
represents a vector consists of meta-info of mutated malicious
traffic. The swarm is iteratively searching the traffic-space
under the guidance of the temporary best particle whose
features are most similar to the adversarial feature. Finally,
the best particle is selected after several iterations.
The details of the above two steps are elaborated in next
two sections IV and V, respectively.
IV. GENERATING ADVERSARIAL FEATURES
We now introduce the procedure of generating adversarial
features. Our enhanced GAN model is shown in Fig. 2c on
the top, which consists of a generator and a discriminator.
Generator. The generator is a feed-forward neural network
whose aim is to transform a malicious feature into its adversarial
version. It takes the concatenation of a malicious feature vector
f and a noise vector z from a distribution pz(z) as input and
outputs a generated feature vector represented by G(f, z). To
train the generator, its loss function is defined in (6) as:
lG = Ef ∈Fmal,z∼pz(z)[logD(G(f, z)) + L(f,G(f, z))] (6)
where Fmal is the set of original malicious features. lG
should be minimized with respect to the weights in the
generator’s network. In this study, we extend prior GANs
by additionally computing a construct error L(·, ·) between
the input and output. In this study, we use the root mean
square error RMSE (x,x′) =
√∑nd
i=1
(
xi − x′i
)2 /n where nd is
the dimensionality of the input and output features. Thus, the
generated features can mimic the distribution of benign features
while approaching malicious ones.
Discriminator. The discriminator is used to distinguish gen-
erated features from benign ones. It is also a feed-forward
neural network whose input consists of the above two classes
of feature vectors, and its output is a probability of determining
an input vector is generated. The discriminator is trained to
maximize the output of generated input vector while minimize
the output of benign input vectors. Thus, its loss function is:
lD = −Ef ∈Fben log(1 − D(f )) − Ef ∈Fgen logD(f ) (7)
where Fben is the set of features extracted from benign traffic
collected in the network the attacker controls beforehand. Fgen
is the set of features generated by the generator.
The training process is an iterative and mutual optimization
between the generator and discriminator until a convergence.
Then, the generated features from the generator can work as
adversarial features Fadver .
5V. MUTATING MALICIOUS TRAFFIC
In this section, we introduce how to automatically mutate
traffic through our heuristic method. First, we design the
mutation operators on malicious traffic. Then, we introduce
the vectorization from traffic to meta-info vectors. Finally, we
propose the PSO-based traffic mutation algorithm.
A. Basic Traffic Mutation Operators
We now introduce how to design basic mutation operators
on malicious traffic (i.e. Ms(·) in Eq. (5)). Generally, the
mutation operators should be able to affect as many types of
features as possible (in order to be generic), even when there
is only limited knowledge of the features used in the targeted
system (for PBA). Besides, the mutation operators should be
functionality-preserving and stealthy to prevent being perceived
by victims. However, the feature extraction methods of learning-
based NIDSs in recent studies seem to be different, which raises
the difficulty to conduct a generic attack. Nonetheless, we find
a consensus on extraction methods among studies on non-
payload-based NIDSs and other network anomaly detection
systems [13], [34]–[39]. Based on this, we summarize the
feature types widely used in these works from a high-level
(Appendix A). This summarized intelligence basically covers
the features used in related works, which also helps attackers
without detailed knowledge of features used in the targeted
system (i.e., PBA) to build the surrogate feature extractor.
Then, we design mutation operators which can affect
all summarized features (see Fig. 7) while preserving the
functionality. Specifically, they consist of modifying original
malicious traffic and injecting/adjusting crafted stealthy traffic:
Original malicious traffic modification. We ensure that the
original traffic will not be deleted and the order of packets will
not be changed. Hence the only mutation operator is:
(a) Altering the interarrival time of packets in original traffic
Crafted stealthy traffic injection. It is non-trivial to determine
packer headers’ content of crafted traffic. Firstly, we can
only craft traffic send from the attacker, and some fields
(MAC/IP/port) in crafted packets need to be consistent with that
of original packets nearby; otherwise the crafted packets cannot
affect features extracted from original packets. Secondly, the
assignment of other fields in header must meets the following
requirements: (1) it will not compromise the maliciousness of
the original traffic; (2) it will not cause the protocol semantics
or communication violation (such as connection breakdown of
TCP traffic); (3) it will not induce responses by the victim (for
stealth and consistency of replay). In light of these requirements,
we list optional methods for generating crafted traffic in Table
II. We note that a previous method used in [33] by modifying
TTL requires the knowledge of the victim’s network topology,
which is extremely strict. Hence, we extend other methods for
different types of traffic without additional knowledge.
Crafted traffic adjustment. There are several adjustments for
crafted packets after being injected:
(b1) Altering the interarrival time of packets in crafted traffic
(b2) Altering the protocol (layer) of packets in crafted traffic
(b3) Altering the payload size of packets in crafted traffic
TABLE II
CRAFTED TRAFFIC GENERATION METHOD
Traffic type Generation methods
Any Subtly assigning the TTL field so that the NIDS can receivethe crafted packet but the victim cannot [33].
TCP Requesting the establishment (i.e., send SYN) of anestablished or establishing connection again.
TCP
(established)
Packets with smaller (already acknowledged) or larger
sequence number than expected.
Packets with smaller or larger acknowledge number than
expected.
UDP/ICMP Padding packets’ payload with semantical-free content (suchas randomly padding).
ICMP Packets with deprecated type or code field.
Fig. 3: Vectorization and Rebuilding between vectors and traffic.
B. Meta-information Vectorization
To facilitate numerical operations on structured traffic
data, we vectorize traffic into meta-info vectors containing
meta-information of original traffic. Note that unlike feature
extraction, this vectorization is invertible, which means that it is
effortless to rebuild traffic from meta-info vectors. Meanwhile,
the aforementioned mutation operators on traffic need to be
reflected in the vectors. Details of the meta-info vectors and an
illustrative example about vectorization and rebuilding between
vectors and traffic are shown in Fig. 3, where x denotes the
meta-info vectors.
To illustrate the meaning of each dimension in x and how
they reflect the mutation operators, an x[i] is further divided
into xmal and xcra f t [] used to represent a packet in original
malicious traffic and several crafted packets right in front of it
in time, respectively. The xmal contains two parts: Timestamp
corresponds to Mutation (a), and Number of crafted packets
determines the size of the list xcra f t . Each craft packet denoted
with xcra f t [i] contains three parts: Interarrival time related to
Mutation (b1) is the time interval from the previous packet;
Number of protocol layers corresponding to Mutation (b2) refers
to its layer in the TCP/IP protocol; Payload size directly reflects
Mutation (b3).
C. PSO-based Automatic Traffic Mutation
We now present our algorithm for automatically searching
the best traffic mutants based on PSO. The general framework
of PSO is shown in Fig. 2c. Each particle represents a mutant
in traffic-space. PSO optimizes a problem by iteratively moving
6Algorithm 1: PSO-based Traffic Mutation Algorithm
Input: Hyperparameters ω, c1, c2, Niter, Nswarm in PSO;
attacker’s overhead budget lc, lt ; the particle swarm S;
grouped original malicious traffic T;
Output: The grouped mutated malicious traffic Tˆ.
1 for each t in T do
2 tv ←Vectorize(t). . meta-info vectorization
3 S←Initialize(tv, Nswarm, lc, lt). . initialize population
4 for i = 1 to Niter do
5 for j = 1 to Nswarm do
O distance evaluation
6 S.dj ← L
(E ′(Rebuild(S.xj)), {Fadver,Fben});
7 Update individual best S.yj referring to S.dj .
8 Update global best S.yˆ referring to S.yj .
9 end
10 for j = 1 to n do . update each v and x
11 vcog ← S.yj − S.xj ; . cognitive force
12 vsoc ← S.yˆ − S.xj ; . social force
13 Randomly sample r1, r2 ∼ puniform(0,1).
14 S.vj ← ωS.vj + r1c1vcog + r2c2vsoc ;
15 S.xj ← UpdateX(S.xj,S.vj, lc, lt).
16 end
17 end
18 Append ˆt← Rebuild(S.yˆ) into Tˆ.
19 end
20 return Tˆ
each particle according to its position and velocity vector.
Each particle’s movement in an iteration is computed by its
velocity, and the velocity is decided by three items: the last state
(inertia), its individual best known position (cognitive force)
denoted with y, and best known position of other particles
(social force) denoted with yˆ. In this study, particles’ position
vectors denoted with x are exactly meta-info vectors, and
velocity vectors denoted with v share the same structure with
x. Each dimension of v represents the difference between the
corresponding position vectors.
The proposed algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1, where
Niter denotes the number of iterations and Nswarm number of
particles in the swarm. In each iteration, we firstly evaluate
each particle’s evasive effectiveness (on line 6) and update
individual best and global best positions (on lines 7-8), which
are respectively used to compute cognitive force (on line 10)
and social force (on line 11). Then, each particle’s v is updated
by multiplying constant weights ω, c1, and c2 with inertia,
cognitive, and social items, respectively (on line 14). Each
particle’s x is then updated according to v (on line 15). Some
highlights in the algorithm are elaborated as follows:
Overhead budget. In this study, we limit the attacker’s
overhead budget from two aspects. The first overhead denoted
with lc is the rate of the number of crafted packets to that of
original packets. The second overhead denoted with lt is the
rate of time elapsed of mutated traffic to that of original traffic.
In other words, the crafted packets number and time elapsed
of mutated traffic must no more than lc and lt , respectively.
Traffic grouping. We find that malicious traffic in different
periods is significantly diverse even for traffic from the same
attack. With this in mind, original malicious traffic is divided
into groups with the same number of packets for a more
meticulous mutation. Hence, the mutation algorithm is executed
once for each group (on line 1), and eventually producing a
set of grouped mutated malicious traffic denoted with Tˆ.
Effectiveness evaluation (on line 6). Specifically, evasive
effectiveness is evaluated in three steps: First, mutated traffic is
rebuilt from the position (i.e., meta-info) vector. Original traffic
is directly retrieved after a replacement with Timestamp in
xmal . As for crafted packets, after determining their protocol
type through Number of protocol layers in xcra f t [i], they can
be rebuilt through the methods mentioned in V-A. Second,
mutated traffic is extracted into features through the surrogate
extractor. Third, the distance between extracted features and
adversarial features is computed and used as the effectiveness.
Population initialization (on line 3). To sufficiently dispersing
initial particles in the search-space, fields in xcra f t [i] and #
crafted pkts in xmal are randomly initialized within the valid
range. As for Timestamp of xmal , we divide the maximum
interarrival time (related to lt ) between every two original
packets into n equal parts, and Timestamp is randomly selected
from these n-section points. And v is filled with 0 initially.
Position update (on line 15). The x is simply updated by
adding with v computed on line 14. However, some dimensions
of x are discrete (e.g., # crafted pkts). We discretize them by
approximating them to the nearest discrete values.
VI. DEFENSE SCHEME
We introduce three probable mitigations against the proposed
attack, including two prior works and our novel scheme:
Adversarial training [17]. This is a promising method widely
used to defend against adversarial examples in the image
domain by retraining the classifiers with correctly-labeled
adversarial examples. However in our traffic-space attack, it can
only reduce the attack effectiveness by limiting the generation
of adversarial features.
Feature selection [42]. This is an important step in feature
engineering to remove redundant/irrelevant dimensions of
features used in ML models, which can effectively improve
detection performance and robustness.
Adversarial feature reduction. We propose a novel scheme
dedicated to evaluate the robustness and defend against such
attacks. In a nutshell, we proactively simulate the proposed
attack and then calculate the degree to which the value of
each feature dimension in the mutated traffic is close to the
adversarial features compared to original value (see Appendix
B for details). The proximity rates of each feature dimension
can be viewed as the adversarial robustness scores. Our main
claim is the high dimensionality of features gives attackers an
opportunity to exploit some vulnerable dimensions to evade
detection. Hence, we propose a defense scheme by deleting a
fraction of feature dimensions with low robustness score.
VII. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we extensively evaluate the performance of
attacks and defenses. We introduce the experimental settings in
VII-A. In VII-B and VII-C, several attacks are evaluated using
different kinds of malicious traffic and different NIDSs. We
extend our attack to PBA and evaluate PBA attacks in VII-D.
Execution cost and impact of parameters are measured in VII-E.
We verify our attack is functionality-preserve in VII-F. Finally,
defense methods are evaluated in VII-G.
7A. Experimental Settings
Datasets. Table III summarizes the information of traffic sets
used in this study, including six well-known attacks from
two up-to-date traffic datasets. Kitsune Dataset [13] was used
to evaluate Kitsune by proactively performing a number of
attacks in their video surveillance network. CIC-IDS2017 [43]
collected traffic for common attacks in a large-scale testbed,
which covers all common devices and middleboxes.
Targeted NIDSs. Firstly, the entire Kitsune [13] is evaluated
as the state-of-the-art off-the-shelf NIDS. Secondly, NIDSs
using different ML classifiers and features are also evaluated:
• Feature extractors: We evaluate two representative feature
extractors: AfterImage [13] is a packet-based extractor in
Kitsune. It computes incremental statistics of packet’s
size, count and jitter in various damped time windows. CI-
CFlowMeter [36] is a flow-based extractor. It extracts several
statistics (e.g., size, count, and duration) of connections.
• ML classifiers: We apply six classifiers that are widely used
in related work to comprehensively cover ML models [44]–
[46]. KitNET is a deep, unsupervised, and ensemble learning
classifier used in Kitsune. We also use classical supervised
ML models including Logistics Regression (LR), Decision
Tree (DT) and Support Vector Machine (SVM), as well as
Multi-Layer Perceptron (MLP) representing deep learning
models. An anomaly detection model Isolation Forest (IF)
is also used.
Baseline attacks. For one thing, we find that previous attacks
against signature-based NIDSs (like [2], [5], [6]) and traditional
anomaly-based NIDSs (like [9]) perform nearly no evasive
effect. This is because these methods focused more on
manipulating the payload. For another, feature-space attacks
(e.g., [26], [30]) including FWA/FGA/FBA cannot participate
either. Hence, we employ traffic-space attacks in very few
related studies as baselines:
• Random Mutation. Note that randomly mutating traffic is
not a weak attack we imagined, but appears in published
works [31], [32]. We use two random mutation methods:
Random-ST is randomly spreading interval-time between
packets; Random-Dup is randomly duplicating partial origi-
nal traffic. As for other methods, packet injection is not used
since we find it has no effect on all traffic sets; delete/reorder
packets compromises functionality of the original traffic.
• Traffic-space White-box Attack (TWA). The only work of
TWA we find is [33], which uses similar mutation operators
as ours. Since attackers have full knowledge of the targeted
NIDSs in their assumption, the output probability of the
classifier can be directly used as the optimization objective.
Metrics. We firstly present four new metrics with their formu-
lations and intuitive descriptions listed in Table V. Notations
used in the metrics are listed in Table IV. According to usage,
evaluation metrics used in this work can be divided into three
categories:
• Evasive effectiveness (MER, DER, and PDR). Roughly
speaking, original Malicious traffic Evasion Rate (MER)
and Detection Evasion Rate (DER) respectively reflects
how much original malicious traffic and all mutated traffic
(including crafted traffic) become evasive after attack. That is
to say, DER additionally considers whether the crafted traffic
TABLE III
ATTACK TRAFFIC DATASETS.
Datasets Attacks # Test Pkts (Malicious) # Training Pkts
Kitsune
Dataset
Mirai Botnet 10,000 (8,079)
100,000
Fuzzing 20,000 (14,898)
SSDP DoS 10,000 (7,987)
CIC
IDS2017
Port Scan 10,000 (2,569)
Brute Force 20,000 (6,136)
DDoS 10,000 (9,966)
TABLE IV
NOTATIONS IN METRICS.
Notation Meaning
Pos predicted positive number in original malicious traffic
P̂os predicted positive number in mutated malicious traffic
P̂osmal,
P̂oscr a f t
malicious and crafted pkts’ number in P̂os
(P̂os = P̂osmal + P̂oscr a f t )
Fadver the set of adversarial features
Fmal the set of features extracted from original malicious traffic
Fˆmal the set of features extracted from mutated malicious traffic
E(·) mathematical expectation
is classified as malicious, which can reflect whether our
attack is stealthy. Since MER and DER are highly dependent
on the selection of the anomaly threshold, we propose a
more accurate metric by measuring the decline rate of the
malicious probabilities outputted by the targeted classifier,
namely malicious Probability Decline Rate (PDR).
• Interpretable indicator (MMR). In order to explain and
understand the reason and principle of evasion attacks on
learning-based NIDSs, we propose an interpretable indicator
Malicious features Mimicry Rate (MMR) which can explicitly
show the change of features in the latent space during attacks.
Specifically, MMR reflects the degree to which malicious
features are close to adversarial features during the mutation.
• Detection performance. We additionally use three typical
metrics—Precision, Recall, and F1-score —to measure the
detection performance of NIDSs. Note that, these three
metrics are measured without any evasion attacks.
B. Evasive Effectiveness of Different attacks
In this section, we compare the evasive effectiveness of
our PGA attacks with three baselines by evading Kitsune
under different traffic sets. We also evaluate the effectiveness of
adversarial features in our attacks by comparing our PSO-based
algorithm with (GAN+PSO) and without (PSO) adversarial
features. We also compare the impact of overhead budget in
our attacks using a lower (lc = 0.2, lt = 2) and a higher budget
(lc = 0.5, lt = 5). Note that, baseline attacks are all with the
higher overhead budget. The results are shown in Fig. 4.
Evasive effectiveness comparison. As evident in the results
of MER/PDR, our attack GAN+PSO perform very well relative
to random mutations at the same budget (lc = 0.5, lt = 5).
The effectiveness of random mutations is extremely unstable;
each mutation only works under specific traffic sets. Moreover,
thanks to our two-step attack framework, our gray-box attack
surprisingly outperforms the state-of-the-art white-box attack
(TWA) in all traffic sets. As for DER, results show that the
drop from MER to DER is <3% in most cases, which shows
that the crafted traffic in our evasion attack is stealthy and
unobservable even with lc = 0.5 (more crafted packets).
8TABLE V
EXPERIMENTAL METRICS.
Metric Name Formulation Intuitive Description
Detection Evasion Rate (DER) 1 − P̂osPos
% undetected mutated traffic (malicious and
crafted) to originally detectable traffic.
original Malicious traffic Evasion Rate (MER) 1 − P̂osmalPos
% undetected mutated malicious traffic (exclude
crafted) to originally detectable traffic.
malicious Probability Decline Rate (PDR) 1 − E(f,fˆ )∈(Fmal,Fˆmal )
C(fˆ )
C(f )
To which extent the malicious probability out-
put declines in the targeted ML classifier.
Malicious features Mimicry Rate (MMR) 1 − E(f,fˆ,fa )∈(Fmal,Fˆmal,Fadver )
L(fˆ,fa )
L(f,fa )
To which extent features extracted from mutated
traffic are close to the adversarial features.
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Fig. 4: The evasive effectiveness of our attacks compared with baselines (higher is better).
Impact of adversarial features. We observe that using adver-
sarial features indeed increases the evasive effectiveness (by
10-20% usually). Especially in Fuzzing, GAN+PSO increases
MER/DER by more than 90% compared with GAN.
Impact of overhead budget. It is easy to understand that a
higher overhead budget (namely, looser limitation) performs
better results. Specifically, GAN+PSO with larger lc and lt
have 20-30% higher MER/DER in most cases.
Performance of different traffic sets. As shown in the results,
our attack achieves >97% MER/DER on half of the traffic sets,
as well as >70% MER/DER on five of six traffic sets. As
for reasons of the relatively poor MER/DER in DDoS, we
believe this is because malicious features are originally farther
from the benign space and beyond the attacker’s ability/budget
(recall Scenario 1 in Figure 2b). In fact, we find the anomaly
score (i.e, RMSE in Kitsune) of original features in DDoS
is many orders of magnitude larger than other scenarios. This
is exactly why its PDR is higher than others (over 99.99%)
but MER/DER is lower. This finding also shows that it is
necessary to consider attacker’s ability/budget on mutating
traffic as well as the original intensity of anomaly instead of
purely comparing the evasion rate. Unfortunately, most related
studies have ignored this.
C. Robustness of other Classifiers and Features
We conduct evasion attacks (our PGA and baselines with
the higher budget) on different NIDSs described in Section
VII-A under Botnet and DDoS traffic. Since DER has been
found to be very similar to MER, we use MER to measure
the evasive performance, which is also the most concerning
indicator for attackers. PDR is not used since it is measured
differently among ML models. Table VI lists the results.
Evasive effectiveness comparison. Compared with baseline
attacks, our attack has broader generality for evading various
ML classifiers using different kinds of features. Specifically,
Random-Dup always performs very poor results while Random-
Dup only has evasive effectiveness for a few cases. Once again,
our attack outperforms TWA in all cases, especially for the
Isolation Forest model. We attribute the generality to the feature-
level mimicking in our model-agnostic attack.
Robustness of different feature sets. NIDSs with flow-based
features are slightly more robust against our attack as well as
other attacks than packet-based ones. This is because our mutate
operators are packet-based. Since flows consist of packets, per-
packet mutation will eventually affect flows, but not vice versa.
Robustness of different classifiers. Based on the results in
Botnet , we find that traditional ML methods are more robust
than deep neural networks. Specifically, KitNET (in Kitsune)
has the (almost) best detection performance but also suffers
the highest evasion rate. The probable reason is that KitNET
clusters the features into groups, which gives attackers a better
chance to influence more feature groups. Through experiments,
we find the top 10% dimensions in original features exploited
by our attack can eventually cover more than 50% of the
features groups. The robustness of the different methods in
DDoS is equally poor, while only IF still maintains good
robustness. Meanwhile, it can be observed that the evasive
performance of different classifiers is diverse significantly. We
think this is a normal phenomenon, which is the same as
different models with different detection performance. In order
to achieve generic a model-agnostic attack, we use Euclidean
9TABLE VI
THE EVASIVE EFFECTIVENESS ON NIDSS WITH OTHER FEATURE EXTRACTORS AND ML CLASSIFIERS.
Feature
Extractor
AfterImage
CIC
FlowMeter
(a) Botnet
ML
Classifier
Detection Evasive (MER)—higher is better
P R F1 R-Dup R-ST TWA Ours
KitNET 0.98 0.92 0.95 0.20% 63.28% 94.98% 99.42%
LR 0.96 0.90 0.93 0.67% 14.96% 50.17% 54.74%
DT 0.79 0.90 0.84 0.61% 14.36% 49.13% 60.36%
SVM 0.99 0.90 0.94 0.82% 9.10% 32.59% 40.31%
MLP 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.87% 4.72% 10.59% 45.15%
IF 0.95 0.93 0.94 0.76% 0.16% 0.52% 33.63%
KitNET 0.87 0.98 0.92 0.00% 9.69% 29.31% 38.89%
LR 0.79 0.97 0.87 2.48% 1.87% 20.37% 40.74%
DT 0.76 0.91 0.83 0.64% 3.70% 17.90% 30.76%
SVM 0.78 0.98 0.87 0.00% 22.19% 41.35% 84.62%
MLP 0.90 0.88 0.89 0.00% 0.00% 9.10% 38.80%
IF 0.97 0.89 0.93 2.46% 0.00% 0.00% 37.31%
(a) DDoS
ML
Classifier
Detection Evasive (MER)—higher is better
P R F1 R-Dup R-ST TWA Ours
KitNET 0.94 0.97 0.95 10.41% 13.74% 52.75% 55.94%
LR 0.96 0.91 0.93 27.09% 16.49% 64.90% 70.59%
DT 0.76 0.91 0.83 27.43% 17.43% 64.27% 69.86%
SVM 0.99 0.90 0.94 29.96% 18.20% 35.19% 79.55%
MLP 0.98 0.91 0.94 25.04% 9.58% 43.47% 50.63%
IF 0.85 0.89 0.87 0.00% 12.99% 0.0% 17.71%
KitNET 0.93 0.90 0.92 0.00% 8.77% 28.59% 32.04%
LR 0.70 0.73 0.71 1.25% 0.00% 14.80% 36.82%
DT 0.67 0.73 0.70 0.00% 3.01% 16.90% 35.56%
SVM 0.75 0.74 0.74 4.13% 2.04% 35.75% 40.92%
MLP 0.72 0.71 0.72 5.58% 15.45% 42.89% 50.35%
IF 1.00 0.89 0.94 0.00% 0.00% 13.44% 25.98%
TABLE VII
THE EVASIVE EFFECTIVENESS ON NIDSS WITH OTHER FEATURE EXTRACTORS AND ML CLASSIFIERS.
Attacks
(Knowledge on features)
Traffic Sets (MER / PDR)—higher is better
Botnet Fuzzing SSDP Port Scan Brute Force DDoS
PBA(0 %) 83.46% / 68.47% 82.68% / 70.04% 53.19% / 57.31% 35.56% / 26.32% 49.50% / 28.07% 33.06% / 99.99%
PBA(50%) 98.77% / 76.16% 98.64% / 82.38% 68.79% / 62.16% 72.72% / 49.78% 52.43% / 30.39% 41.22% / 99.99%
PBA(75%) 99.28% / 77.87% 98.26% / 81.89% 82.62% / 67.06% 76.82% / 52.38% 60.12% / 33.48% 50.45% / 99.99%
PGA(100%) 99.42% / 80.84% 98.69% / 88.67% 78.53% / 65.42% 97.66% / 54.57% 71.81% / 39.86% 55.94% / 99.99%
distance to measure the similarity of features for any models.
However, this may not be accurate methods for ML models to
understand and measure features. Our goal in this work is to
present a method that is as generic as possible to measure the
robustness of different ML models to provide NIDS designers
with some important insights.
D. Attacks with Limited Knowledge of Features
So far, we have evaluated the effectiveness of our attack
under the PGA assumption. We now extend our attack with
limited knowledge of features used in targeted NIDSs (i.e.,
PBA). Specifically, we evaluate three types of attackers, who
know the 75%, 50%, and 0% features that are accurately
used by NIDSs, respectively. Recall Section III-A, the only
difference between PBA and PGA is the surrogate feature
extractor used by the attacker. For PBA, besides limited known
features, the attacker will also extract commonly used features
in Appendix A. Especially for PBA(0%), the attacker without
any knowledge about the target system can only simulate the
extractor by using other features. We use Kitsune as the
targeted NIDS and evaluate the MER and PDR of three PBAs
and the PGA in all traffic sets. The results are in Table VII.
As before, we think that PDR can better reflect the evasive
effectiveness compared with MER. As shown in the results,
PBA(50%) and PBA(75%) perform high PDR that is similar
to PGA. Even for attackers without any knowledge, PBA(0%)
still has a strong evasive ability (Compared with PGA, the
drop of PDR is within 20%). The key insight is that even if
we cannot accurately know the features used by NIDSs, the
mutation method computed by our attack through simulated
features is also effective on real features (that is, it can also
effectively transform real malicious features into benign). This
finding seems to be very frustrating and frightening for NIDSs
 7 : $
    
    
 
    
    
  
    
    
   
    
    
   
   
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 7 L
 P
 H 
 ( O
 D S
 V H
 G 
  6
 H F
 R Q
 G V
   
 S H
 U  
  N
  S
 N W
 V   % R W Q H W
 0 X W D W L R Q
 & O D V V L I L F D W L R Q
 ( [ W U D F W L R Q
      
      
      
      
      
       
 ( Y
 D V
 L Y
 H 
 ( I
 I H
 F W
 L Y
 H Q
 H V
 V
 3 ' 5
 0 ( 5
 7 : $
    
    
 
    
    
  
    
    
   
    
    
   
   
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 7 L
 P
 H 
 ( O
 D S
 V H
 G 
  6
 H F
 R Q
 G V
   
 S H
 U  
  N
  S
 N W
 V   ) X ] ] L Q J
 0 X W D W L R Q
 & O D V V L I L F D W L R Q
 ( [ W U D F W L R Q
      
      
      
      
      
       
 ( Y
 D V
 L Y
 H 
 ( I
 I H
 F W
 L Y
 H Q
 H V
 V
 3 ' 5
 0 ( 5
Fig. 5: Execution Cost and Impact of Parameters
like Kitsune, meaning that a weak attacker can easily make
a considerable portion of malicious traffic becoming evasive.
E. Execution Cost and Impact of Parameters
It is necessary to measure the execution cost for attacks,
especially for attackers with limited computing resources.
Here, we use TWA as a comparison algorithm to represent
the lower bound of execution time. This is because TWA
requires the output value of the classifier, so the quality
of candidate solutions (i.e., traffic mutants) can be quickly
measured, but we do not have this knowledge in our attack.
We also compare the impact of three key parameters on the
execution time and evasive performance. We denote our attacks
using different parameters with (Niter ,Nswarm,Nadver ): Niter
and Nswarm denotes the number of iterations and particles in
PSO, and Nadver denotes the number of adversarial features.
The results are shown in Fig. 5, where we use Kitsune under
two traffic sets since other sets have similar results.
It is shown that our attack with (3,6,100) can approximate
the execution time of TWA while performing better evasive
performance than TWA. For other parameters, our attacks are
acceptable in execution time. Larger parameters have better
evasive performance but will consume more time. To balance
10
this trade-off, we think (5,10,1000) is the best combination of
parameters, which is also chosen for other parts of experiments.
F. Verification of Malicious Functionality
To be rigorous, although we guarantee the mutation operators
in Section V-A will not compromise the malicious functionality
of original traffic, we still verify the malicious functionality of
the mutated traffic in all six traffic sets.
To measure the malicious functionality, we use three types
of indicators: attack effect, malicious behavior and attack
efficiency, and compare them in original and mutated traffic.
Take Botnet as an example to illustrate the three indicators: In
our selected traffic, an attacker used a malware called Mirai
to scan IoT devices in the LAN and successfully scanned 8
open devices. In this scenario, attack effect is the final result of
the attack, which is that 8 devices were successfully scanned.
Malicious behavior contains all offensive behaviors regardless
of whether they eventually affect, which is the number of scans.
Attack efficiency is related to the elapsed time of the attack.
Obviously, attack effect has a greater impact on functionality
than malicious behavior, and the change rate of attack efficiency
must be within the attacker’s overhead budget lt .
We use VMs and Dockers to simulate the experimental
testbed for each traffic set by referring to their papers [13], [43].
Then we use Tcpreplay and Tcplivereplay to replay original
and mutated attack traffic in the testbed and observe the three
indicators. Since different attacks have diverse functionalities,
the specific meanings of three indicators are case-by-case,
making the validation experiment straightforward but tedious,
so we put the details in Appendix C and leave the result
here: Mutated traffic generated through our evasion attack can
preserve the malicious functionality. Specifically, attack effect
keeps unchanged in all cases and malicious behavior is reduced
only in DoS/DDoS attacks (attack bandwidth is decreased due
to increased time interval, but this reduction does not exceed
the attacker’s budget (lt ). As for attack efficiency, although our
method may slow down some kinds of attack, the change rate
of elapsed time is always less than lt .
G. Performance of Defense Schemes
In this section, we evaluate three mitigations mentioned in
Section VI. For adversarial training (AT), we retrain the ML
classifiers with 80% relabeled adversarial features and use the
remaining 20% for testing. For feature selection (FS), we use
embedded lasso regression model to retain 80% dimensions.
As for our adversarial feature reduction (AFR), we also retain
80% feature dimensions. We use Kitsune in all traffic sets,
and use the decline of metrics (∆MER/PDR/MMR) to evaluate
the defense performance. The results are shown in Fig. 6.
Compared with AT and FS, our AFR is very effective in
reducing MER/PDR/MMR. We observe that AT has a very
limited and unstable defensive effect against the proposed
attack. This is because it can limit the generation of adversarial
features, but cannot prevent vulnerable feature dimensions
from being exploited during traffic mutation. FS can perform
better defense effectiveness in some cases. This shows that
using fewer feature dimensions can to some extent increase
the difficulty for attackers to transform the entire malicious
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Fig. 6: The defense performance (higher is better).
features. We also measure the change of F1-score to evaluate
whether the defense methods compromise the original detection
performances. We find the change is quite small (within ±5%),
so they are not depicted in the figure for reasons of spaces.
VIII. DISCUSSIONS
We discuss limitations and potential improvements of our
attacks as follows.
Limitations. As mentioned in Section II, our method is
designed for evading NIDSs without payload inspection, so it is
invalid for systems additionally using payload-based detection.
However, this problem can be easily solved by combining the
polymorphic blending attack [9] with ours. And this can be
easily implemented: leveraging polymorphic blending attack to
encrypt the payload of original malicious traffic and using our
method to inject crafted packets. Another limitation is that our
attack is off-line at present, but this can be solved by replaying
mutated traffic since we have proofed that replayed traffic can
conduct the same malicious intent as the original attack.
Background traffic. In the proposed attack, we inject some
crafted traffic which can be aggregated with original packets
in order to impact features. However, some unpredictable
background traffic (i.e., some traffic that is not controlled
by the attacker but can also achieve the victim or NIDS) may
disrupt our mutated traffic on some features. Nonetheless, we
find that only features aggregated by destination information
(e.g., dstIP) are affected. Thus, the impact is extremely little
(e.g., Kitsune has no features extracted only by destination).
Improving the evasion attack. In this paper, we pay more
attention to explore a more practical attack rather than try our
best to improve the evasion rate. For one thing, we only use
the default settings in the implementation of PSO and GAN in
this study. For example, we simply use the set of parameters
recommended in [47] (ω=0.7298, c1=c2=1.49618) in the PSO
algorithm. For another, we use Euclidean distance to measure
the similarity of features in this work. We suggest that future
work should focus on whether other distance function or careful
parameter tuning can perform better results.
IX. RELATED WORK
Adversarial attacks on IDS. Attacks on (N)IDS itself have
been extensively studied [2]–[4]. Evasion attack, as an impor-
11
tant and common form, can be divided into two types: evading
signature-based systems [5]–[8] and anomaly-based systems [9]–
[11], [48], [49]. Recently, machine learning, especially deep
learning, has been increasingly used in NIDS for anomaly-
based detection [1], [13], [37], [45], [46]. In this situation,
existing evasion methods on traditional NIDSs are no longer
valid. However, more opportunities can be provided due to
internal vulnerabilities of ML [14], [15], [50].
Evasion attacks on learning-based systems. There have
been several works on evasion attacks against learning-based
systems in other domains. Adversarial example in the domain
of computer vision has been widely studied [17]–[19], [51].
Gradient Descent method [23] and Genetic Programming (GP)
[24] were used for evading PDF malware classifier. MalGAN
[25] was proposed to generate adversarial malware examples
to evade learning-based malware detection systems using
binary vectors. GAN-based method was also used to fool real-
time video classification systems [20]. Text sentiment analysis
system was evaded by stochastic optimization method [21].
However, due to the specificity of network traffic and learning-
based NIDS, these methods cannot be directly applied.
Feature-space attacks on learning-based NIDSs. Most prior
studies on evading learning-based NIDSs assume that attackers
can directly modify the feature vectors. According to the
attacker’s knowledge of the targeted NIDS, feature-space
attacks can be divided into three categories (recall Table I):
• Feature-space White-box Attack (FWA). FWA requires
full knowledge of the targeted NIDS. In [26], four gradient-
based adversarial example attacks were directly used to
evade an MLP classifier. Likewise, adversarial examples
were leveraged in [30] to evade Kitsune. Similar gradient-
based methods were also used in [52] to attack NIDSs for
IoT networks, and in [53] to attack GAN-based NIDSs.
• Feature-space White-box Attack (FGA). FGA requires the
feedbacks of targeted classifier (without other knowledge of
the classifier compared with FWA). In [29], a GAN-based
architecture IDS-GAN was proposed to generate evasive
features. In [54], a boundary-based methods was proposed
to evade DoS intrusion detection systems by perturbing
continuous and discrete features.
• Feature-space Black-box Attack (FBA). FBA neither
requires feedbacks nor any knowledges on the classifier.
In [55], four feature dimensions were randomly modified to
attack learing-based botnet detectors.
However, feature-space attacks are impractical since feature
extraction in learning-based NIDSs is always irreversible.
Traffic-space attacks on learning-based NIDSs. There were
also a few studies directly change network traffic, which can
be divided into two categories:
• Traffic-space White-box Attack (TWA). In [33], a white-
box attack using similar mutation operators as ours was
proposed. However, their assumption that the attacker has
full knowledge of the NIDS is hard to achieve in practice.
• Random mutations. Several mutations were proposed in
[31] to evade botnet detectors. Random obfuscations on
traffic were proposed in [32]. However, these methods are
purely stochastic and lack of theoretical guidance.
X. CONCLUSION
This paper describes the first step toward developing a
systematic study on practical traffic-space evasion attacks
on learning-based NIDSs. Experimental results show our
attack is effective (>97% evasion rate in half cases) and the
proposed defense method can effectively mitigate such attacks.
Surprisingly, our attack outperforms the state-of-the-art white-
box attack while using approximate execution cost, and is
effective even without any knowledge of the targeted systems.
We extensively measure the robustness of various learning-
based NIDSs and provide important findings. Our finding
demonstrates that the paradigm of feature engineering should
be shifted; we deem the detection performance together with
anti-evasion robustness both need to be taken into consideration
while designing features used in systems. We firmly believe
that our work provides important insights for improving the
robustness of learning-based NIDSs and inspires more attention
to the robust feature engineering in learning-based systems.
APPENDIX A
SUMMARIZATION OF FEATURE EXTRACTION METHODS
As mentioned in Section V-A, we summarize the feature
types widely used in related work [13], [34]–[39] from a high-
level. This summarized intelligence basically helps to conduct
a generic attack and build the surrogate feature extractor for
PBA. Specifically, feature extraction methods can be described
in the following three aspects:
• The data form of network traffic. This is also referred
to as basic units for further process, which generally
involves packet-based and session-based (including flow-
based and connection-based) methods in a majority of cases.
Specifically, a packet-based method inspects headers of all
packets going through a network link, while session-based
methods look at aggregated information of related packets
of network traffic in the form of flow or connection.
• Basic measurements. There are three network measure-
ments extensively used in current research, which are size-
related, count-related, and time-related. Take the packet-
based extraction for illustration, size-related and count-
related measurements are packets’ length (in bytes) and
number of packets, respectively. And time-related measure-
ments are inter-arrival time between packets.
• Methods for processing measurements. Given the data
form and measurements, we need to determine that measure-
ments are collected from which packets or sessions as well as
how to compute feature values from them. Specifically, these
two phases can be summarized as follows: (i) Aggregate
collection: Some work collects measurements with same
traffic direction (inbound or outbound) or fields in the packet
header such as IP address and port number. Other maintaining
a window with a fixed time interval or packet length/bytes.
(ii) Computing statistics: Besides using measurements di-
rectly, statistics are computed such as the mean, variance,
and standard deviation of a single measurement or the
covariance and distance between different measurements.
Some other methods in mathematical statistics such as
frequency distribution are also employed.
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Based on the summarization, Fig. 7 describes two extractors
used in this work. Besides, we also illustrate how our mutation
operators can influence different features in the figure.
Fig. 7: Illustration of summarized features, description of two
extractors, and how the proposed mutation operators affect all features.
APPENDIX B
ADVERSARIAL FEATURE EVALUATION ALGORITHM
Algorithm 2 shows the specific robustness evaluation method
mentioned in Section VI. we proactively simulate the evasion
attack and measure the MMR (on line 7). Then by considering
whether this feature vector can evade the classifier, a penalty or
reward is added to adversarial robustness score (on lines 8-9).
Finally, the adversarial robustness of a feature set is quantized
into the score between −1 to 1 (on line 12) of each feature.
Algorithm 2: Adversarial Feature Evaluation Algorithm
Input: Fmal , Fˆmal , Fadver , Fben, anomaly threshold h;
Output: Adversarial feature score s of each dimension.
1 nd ← the dimensionality of a feature vector;
2 n f ← Number of features in Fmal or Fˆmal ;
3 Initialize s with nd zeros.
4 for each f ,fˆ in Fmal ,Fˆmal ; i = 0 to n f − 1 do
5 Initialize an r with nd zeros.
6 for j = 1 to nd do . each dimension
7 rj ←MMR(fj, fˆj,Fadver,Fben);
O add a penalty if successfully evading
8 if E(f ) > h and E(fˆ ) < h then sj ← sj − rj ;
9 else sj ← sj + (1 − rj ) ; . add a reward
10 end
11 end
12 Normalize s through dividing each dimension by n f .
13 return s
APPENDIX C
VERIFYING THE MALICIOUS FUNCTIONALITY
Detailed results of verifying malicious functionality of all six
attack traffic sets are listed in Table VIII. Note that, although
the attack effect cannot be measured in some cases, in fact
the results of attack effect are generally the same as malicious
behavior. For example, in Brute Force, we do not know the
true password of the victim server, but if we guarantee that
all the original password attempts exist in the mutated traffic,
then obviously the final result is the same.
TABLE VIII
COMPARISON OF THE MALICIOUS FUNCTIONALITY
(a) Botnet
Indicators Original Mutated Comparison
Number of open
devices scanned 8 8 —
Total number of
scans 8500 8500 —
Time elapsed 0.795s 2.364s ↑ (197%)
(b) Fuzzing
Indicators Original Mutated Comparison
Impact of fuzzing
on target systems
This cannot be simulated because we have no
specific information about the targeted system
# pkts containing
fuzzing payload 5353 5353 —
Time elapsed 3.81s 2.90s ↓ (24%)
(c) SSDP DoS
Indicators Original Mutated Comparison
Impact of DoS attack
on targeted systems
This cannot be simulated because we have no
specific information about the targeted system
Attack bandwidth 35Mbps 20Mbps ↓ (39%)
Time elapsed This can be reflected by the preventindicator (bandwidth)
(d) Brute Force
Indicators Original Mutated Comparison
Whether the targeted
FTP server is cracked
This cannot be simulated because we do not
know the true password of the targeted system
Total number of
password attempts 60 60 —
Time elapsed 2.83s 11.26s ↑ (298%)
(e) Port Scan
Indicators Original Mutated Comparison
Number of open
ports scanned 3 3 —
Total number of
scans 4810 4810 —
Time elapsed 6.55s 26.89s ↑ (310%)
(f) DDoS
Indicators Original Mutated Comparison
Impact of DDoS attack
on targeted systems
This cannot be simulated because we have no
specific information about the targeted system
Attack bandwidth 107Mbps 68Mbps ↓ (36%)
Time elapsed This can be reflected by the preventindicator (bandwidth)
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